Northwest Carriers, Inc. And State Insurance Fund v. Industrial Commission of Utah Second Injury Fund, And Herbert Merz : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1981
Northwest Carriers, Inc. And State Insurance Fund
v. Industrial Commission of Utah Second Injury
Fund, And Herbert Merz : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors. James R. Black; Attorney for Plaintiff Richard I. Ashton and
Frank V. Nelson; Attorneys for Defendants
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Northwest Carriers v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, No. 17170 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2393
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
,· 
OF THE STATE 01' U'l'AH1°';-;~· 
- '( i 
--------.-....... ~ .. 
NORTHWEST CARRIERS, INC. and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
.. 
-vs- Plaintiffs,~. .• . :.·. . ,, .. -~ ~fj!· 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF .•.. ,.;;,:. ;;i 
UTAH SECOND INJURY FUND, lQi4. . 
HERBERT MERZ, 
' :• ~ ~· i~~= :· M~:.:alt .. ·. :'f"\:~'{ 
500 Ten West Broa.,,-~ 
Salt Lake City, Utah Hl' .. ) :.. 
Attorneys fo~ Plaintiff 
State Insurance Fund· 
"\ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NORTHWEST CARRIERS, INC. and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH SECOND INJURY FUND, and 
HERBERT MERZ, 
Defendants. 
MELVIN E. INGERSOLL and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
RICHARD M. CAMP, SECOND 
INJURY FUND and INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 17170 
Case No. 17245 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT'S SECOND INJURY FUND 
AND INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
James R. Black 
BLACK & MOORE 
500 Ten West Broadway Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
State Insurance Fund 
FRANK V. NELSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Commission & 
Second Injury Fund 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF CASE ....... . 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ... 
ARGUMENT 
AGE, EDUCATION, INTELLIGENCE, JOB 
AVAILABILITY, ETC. ARE NOT FACTORS 
IN AWARDING MEDICAL AND TEMPORARY 
TOTAL DISABILITY PAYMENTS TO BE 
PAID BY SECOND INJURY FUND. 
CONCLUSION. . . 
Cases Cited 
Morello v. Baldanza Bakery, Inc., 
Page 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
8 
105 N.J., supra, 575, 253 A.2d 583 (1969) . . . . . . • 4 
Young v. Scotia Coal Co., 
Ky., 464 S. W. 2d 796 (1971) 
McPhie v. Industrial ColTU!lission, 
551 P.2d 504 and 567 P.2d 153 
Statutes Cited 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 (1953) 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ... 
Treatise Cited 
Larson, Workman's Compensation Law 
4 
6 
1,2,3,4,6 
7 
Vol. 2, § 59.20, p. 10-285. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
-i-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NORTHWEST CARRIERS, INC. and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH SECOND INJURY FUND, and 
HERBERT MERZ, 
Defendants. 
MELVIN E. INGERSOLL and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
RICHARD M. CAMP, SECOND 
INJURY FUND and INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 17170 
Case No. 17245 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT'S SECOND INJURY FUND 
AND INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
These two cases involve the interpretation of Section 
35-1-69, Utah Code Ann. ( 1953), as it pertains to reimburse-
ment to the insurance carriers from the Second Injury Fund on 
factors such as the employees' age, education, intelligence 
and job availability. 
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DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The commission apportioned compensation and medical 
expenses in proportion to the disability caused by the industri 
accident and the proportion of disability under Section 35-1-69 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), which was pre-existing. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants on appeal, Industrial Commission of Utah and 
Second Injury Fund seek an affirmance of the rulings of the 
Industrial Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Re: Northwest Carriers, Inc. (Merz) 
Herbert Merz sustained an industrial injury to his back 
on August 11, 1974 while employed by Northwest Carriers, Inc. 
A medical panel report found Merz to have a 55 percent 
impairment with 40 percent of that impairment due to u,_ ; ,,_ 
dustrial injury of August 11, 1974, and 15 percent impairment 
as the result of a prior industrial accident. The prior injury 
was incurred in 1963 while working for the Utah Highway Departmer 
and compensation and medical expenses were paid. 
The plaintiff, State Insurance Fund, is now asking re-
imbursement of 60 percent of compensation and medicals instead c 
the 15 percent awarded by the Industrial Commission. 
Re: Melvin E. Ingersoll (Camp) 
Mr. Camp incurred an industrial accident on August 6, B 
He was found to have a 68 percent loss of bodily function with 
three percent of the 68 percent being pre-existing psychiatric 
problems. The State Insurance Fund is asking reimbursement of 
-2-
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32 percent of advances for medical expenses and temporary total 
compensation instead of the three percent awarded by the 
Industrial Commission. 
ARGUMENT 
AGE, EDUCATION, INTELLIGENCE, JOB 
AVAILABILITY, ETC. ARE NOT FACTORS 
IN AWARDING MEDICAL AND TEMPORARY 
TOTAL DISABILITY PAYMENTS TO BE 
PAID BY SECOND INJURY FUND. 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), Section 35-1-69, provides that 
the second injury "special fund" shall be applicable to an 
injured worker who has: 
.. previously incurred a 
permanent incapacity by accidental 
injury, disease, or congenital causes 
... which results in permanent in-
capacity which is substantially greater 
than he would have incurred if he had 
not had the pre-existing incapacity. 
'Plaintiffs assert that a number of pre-existing problems 
of the applicants in both cases have resulted in substantially 
greater incapacity than would have occurred absent those problems. 
Among the pre-existing conditions cited by the plaintiffs, are 
age, education, intelligence quotient, job availability, personal-
ity, problems (troubled childhood, unsuccessful marriages, in-
ability to undergo rehabilitation), lack of skills, alcoholism 
and drug abuse, and a previous back injury. The prior back injury 
noted by the plaintiffs is a previously incurred "accidental 
injury" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. (1953), Section 35-
1-69, and if it has resulted in a substantially greater injury 
than would have resulted without it, the "special fund" will be 
liable for the related medical care and compensation. 
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In the camp case, the plaintiffs cite a pre-existing 
factor to be the applicant's having obtained only a fourth gra~ 
education and his sole skill being that of a journeyman brick-
layer. The limited education and skills of the applicant do no 
qualify as "accidental injuries, disease, or congenital causes• 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. (1953), Section 35-1-69. 
They are pre-existing conditions that are part of the indi vidua: 
In Morello v. Baldanza Bakery, Inc. , l O 5 N. J. , supra, 5 
253 A.2d 583 (1969), the New Jersey court dealt with the issue 
of whether its "special fund" was liable to the petitioner for 
compensation due to his injured left arm and hand because he wa: 
unable to speak, understand or write English. The court held 
that it could discern no legislative intent to make the special 
fund liable for payment of part of an employee's total disabiH 
where the pre-existing factor was solely the poor literacy or 
low intelligence quotient of the injured employee. Similarily, 
in the instant cases, Utah Code Ann. (1953), Section 35-1-69, 
demonstrates no legislative intent to hold Utah's "special fund' 
liable where the factor at issue is the poor education and lack 
of skill of the injured worker. 
Plaintiffs cite the age of applicants as being another 
factor substantially increasing incapacity. Obviously, age is 
not an "accidental injury, disease, or congenital cause" such 
that Utah"s special fund will be liable to the applicant for 
compensation. 
The Kentucky court in Young v. Scotia coal co. , Ky. , 461 
S.W. 2d 796 (1971) dealt with the issue of whether a pre-existb 
-4-
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condition attributable to normal aging was a disease condition 
di within the meaning of its special fund provision. The court held 
that aging was not a disease. In the present cases, plaintiffs 
do not assert that the applicants' age has resulted in any de-
generative condition. They allege that age alone is a pre-exist-
ing condition. Surely Utah's legislature did not intend that the 
"special fund" be liable for the natural aging process and normal 
wear and tear on the human body. 
In Larson's Workman Compensation he designates a heading 
as: 
AGE,Effects of: not a pre-existing condition 59.20.This 
is explained in the text as follows: 
"to be apportionable, then, an impairment 
must have been independently producing 
some degree of disability before the 
accident, and must continue to operate as 
a source of disability after the accident." 
P. 10-285, Vol. 2 
There is no evidence in this case at all that applicant's 
age, education and experience were independently producing some 
degree of disability before the accident. 
Plaintiffs refer to a number of the applicants' personal 
problems which predated the industrial accident and argue that the 
"special fund" must compensate applicant for his "unemployability" 
as caused by those personal troubles. 
In the Camp case, plaintiffs seek to place liability upon 
the "special fund" based upon the employee's inability to complete 
rehabilitation training, his unsuccessful attempts at marriage 
and his troubled childhood. Plaintiff's can point to no direct 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
relationship between these alleged previous conditions and the 
applicant's industrial back injury unless they allege that the 
combination of his personality problems and his accident have 
damaged his employability. A history of emotional instability, 
coupled with an industrial accident is not a disease condition 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. (1953), Section 35-1-69. 
The fact that such emotional problems interfere with the appli-
cant's ability to compete on the job market is not sufficient 
cause to incur the liability of Utah's "special fund." 
The plaintiff's rely upon recent cases that are not 
applicable. McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 551 P.2d 504 and 
567 P.2d 153 is cited as the authority for their position. 
McPhie was declared by the medical panel to be 100 perc1 
permanently and totally disabled. Age, education and work avai. 
ability were not an element in that case or any of the other ca1 
cited by the State Insurance Fund. 
Whenever "remainder" is used in the cases cited there 
was no reference to the remainder being wholly or partially the 
result of age, education or work availability. McPhie does reli 
the purpose of the Second Injury Fund: 
One of the purposes of the statue above 
(35-1-69) referred to was to encourage 
employers to hire handicapped workers by 
requiring the Special Fund to assume re-
sponsibility should the employee receive 
an industrial injury from which he might 
become totally disabled from further em-
ployment. The second purpose was to 
establish a broader base of responsibility 
for pre-existing conditions. 
If one of the purposes was to encourage the hiring 
-6-
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of the handicapped, then we must look to the definition of handi-
capped for enlightenment. If the Second Injury Fund is liable 
it also becomes necessary to define age, education, and experience 
as a prior handicap. To so define and equate in my opinion is a 
stretch of the imagination and a stretch way beyond the stated 
purpose. 
A handicapped person is defined by the Federal Government 
in implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as: 
Any person who (a) has a physical 
or mental impairment which substantially 
limits one or more of such persons major 
life activities, (b) has a record of such 
impairment, or (c) is regarded as having 
such impairment. 
The Administrative Law Judge outlined in his Order of 
the Merz case (R 257) the difference between impairment and 
disability as it applies to these cases. It is important that 
the statute, sec. 69, speaks of impairment and not of disability. 
The Judge goes on to say: 
The State Insurance Fund contends 
that it should be entitled to reimbursement 
for 60 percent of all amounts paid during 
the last six years by way of weekly compen-
sation benefits and medical expenses. Such 
a conclusion does not necessarily follow. 
This throws onto the Second Injury Fund all 
of the consequence of the applicant's dis-
ability regardless of the relative contribu-
tion of the physical impairment sustained 
by the applicant in the industrial injury 
contrasted to his pre-existing impairment. 
The only factors which have resulted in the 
applicant no longer being reasonably em-
ployable are the fact that he sustained a 
40 percent permanent physical impairment 
as the result of the industrial accident 
and he has become six years older which is 
the primary reason for his not being a good 
candidate for rehabilitation. Were the 
-7-
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The 
example can 
Fund. There 
applicant younger, he almost certainly 
would be a candidate for rehabilitation. 
His age, therefore, is a dominant factor 
in his being disabled. In fact, pre-
existing conditions only contribute 15 
percent to the applicant's overall im-
pairment or disability, all other factors 
having occurred since the time of the 
industrial accident. It follows, there-
fore, that the State Insurance Fund should 
be reimbursed for 15 percent of the expense 
it has incurred out of the Second Injury Fund 
rather than the 60 percent requested. 
Camp case is a good illustration of how extreme 
be made to shift a responsibility to the Second 
is only a three percent pre-existing impairment 
an 
In: 
at 
a 65 percent impairment due to the industrial accident. One ha 
to ignore reality and the years of prior decisions (until Orte~ 
to believe that 68 percent is "substantially greater" than 65 
percent. The State Insurance Fund is now asking a 32 percent r 
irnbursement instead of the three percent pre-existing. 
Section 69 was intended to compensate prior handicaps. 
Age, education, experience and employment opportunities are si1 
not incapacities or handicaps intended to be compensated for ur. 
that section. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission made awards in both these cas 
consistant with the findings. Any increased responsibility 
placed upon the Second Injury Fund is without legislative intm 
and contrary to all past practices of the Commission. 
DAE h . J,P.~ TD t is day of April, 1981 
Assistant Attorney General 
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M A I L I N G C E R T I F I C A T E 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing BRIEF 
were mailed, postage prepaid this ~y of April, 1981, to 
the following: 
Richard I. Ashton, Esq. 
Suite 2000 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James R. Black, Esq. 
500 Ten West Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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